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INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative stability and growth pact amongst European Union (EU)
governments to underpin the introduction of a single currency and a "single market" within the EU. The alternative pact
proposed in this paper embraces a number of new aspects of integration within the EU which entails a number of
insights. These include a different analysis from that of "new monetarism" (see Arestis and Sawyer, 1998b), new
objectives for economic policy to include employment and growth, and new institutions to reduce various kinds of
disparities across the EU. 
The paper begins by critically examining the Stability and Growth Pact, which accompanied the introduction of euro in
January 1999, but which has not received as much attention in the policy debates on the euro as some other aspects of
it. We follow this with a discussion of the institutional underpinnings of the euro, and we argue that the institutional
arrangements have a number of weaknesses. We then propose an alternative pact governing monetary and fiscal policy
with the promotion of the objective of full employment and which requires the creation of new institutions. A final
section summarises and concludes. 
THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
The Stability and Growth Pact accompanied the introduction of a single currency in the European Union as part of the
third stage of economic and monetary union. It will govern the economic policies of the member countries which have
joined the single currency and strongly constrain the policies of those who do not join. 
In its earliest form the Stability Pact was advanced by Theo Waigel, the former German finance minister, in November
1995. Agreement on the main components of the now renamed Stability and Growth Pact was reached at the European
Council Summit in Dublin in December 1996, and it was formally adopted at the Amsterdam Summit in July 1997. Before
the final settlement on the Pact was reached, there had been several rounds of negotiations. It was suggested by the
French government that a better balance would have to be struck between budgetary discipline and employment policy.
Two suggestions were made: the first called for greater emphasis to be placed on Articles 102a and 103 of the
Maastricht Treaty and was aimed at reforming economic co-ordination; and the second called for greater political
control over economic policy which would have to include monetary policy. The second proposal was a non-starter for
the German and the Dutch governments. The aim of the first proposal was reflected in the Resolution on Growth and
Employment, which was adopted by the European Council along with the Stability and Growth Pact. However, unlike the
Stability Pact, this resolution was not accompanied by any secondary legislation nor it would seem the political will from
member states to implement it. The Resolution simply states an aspiration, that employment policy should be
co-ordinated at the EU level, however, employment policy implementation still remains firmly in the hands of national
authorities. It appears unlikely that there will exist a sufficient legal framework for EU level employment policy (Snyder,
1998, p. 64).
The Stability and Growth Pact alongside the Maastricht Treaty creates four rules for economic policy. Bovenberg and de
Jong (1997) suggest that these four rules were created in the belief that they would facilitate the ECB's primary task
of price stability. The four rules are that the ECB was granted independence from political influence; the rule of no-bail
out of national government deficits was introduced; the monetary financing of government deficits was prohibited; and
member states must avoid "excessive" deficits (which were defined as more than 3 per cent of GDP). 
The Stability and Growth Pact consists of three components: a single European Council Resolution and two CouncilRegulations. The Resolution commits all parties, member states, the Commission and the Council "to implement the
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner". The Council Regulations themselves, unlike the
Resolution, have legal force and can be seen as composed of two complementary elements. First, the "preventative"
element: this resolution refers to the strengthening of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of
economic policies. It commits those member states which join the single currency to submit to the Commission a
stability programme. These stability programmes will have to be updated annually and must detail the member states
medium term budget objective, the main assumptions about economic developments, and the projected paths for both
the deficit ratio and the debt ratio. Non-euro members should submit a "convergence plan" which should be similar in
outline to the stability programme. These programmes are intended to act as an early warning system and will signal
when a member state is close to breaching the reference values detailed in Protocol 5 of the Treaty. The second
Council regulation is the "deterrent" element. This is aimed at speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure and it seeks to reduce the scope for discretion, which is allowed under the Maastricht
Treaty.
THE THEORY OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
The Stability and Growth Pact appears to be based on what we have elsewhere termed new monetarism (Arestis and
Sawyer, 1998b). The essential features of new monetarism are:
(i) politicians in particular, and the democratic process in general, cannot be trusted with economic policy formulation
with a tendency to make decisions which have stimulating short-term effects (reducing unemployment) but which are
detrimental in the longer term (notably a rise in inflation). In contrast, experts in the form of central bankers are not
subject to political pressures to court short-term popularity, and can take a longer term perspective where it is
assumed that there is a conflict between the short-term and the long-term. The logic underpinning this reasoning
mirrors that found in the rules versus discretion debate. Policy makers" scope for using discretion should be curtailed
and the possibility of negative spillovers from irresponsible fiscal policy must be reduced within the eurozone, hence,
fiscal policy will be permanently constrained by the Stability Pact and monetary policy has been removed from national
authorities and from political authorities and placed with the ECB. 
(ii) inflation is a monetary phenomenon and can be controlled through the monetary policy. The money supply is difficult
(or impossible) to control directly, but the central bank can set the key interest rate (the "repo" rate) to influence the
monetary conditions, which in turn influence the future rate of inflation. 
(iii) the level of unemployment fluctuates around a supply-side determined equilibrium rate of unemployment, generally
labelled the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). The level of the NAIRU may be favourably affected
by a "flexible" labour market, but is unaffected by the level of aggregate demand or by productive capacity. 
(iv) fiscal policy is impotent in terms of its impact on real variables and as such it should be subordinate to monetary
policy in controlling inflation. It is recognised, though, that the government budget position will fluctuate during the
course of the business cycle but in the context of an essentially passive fiscal policy.
A further feature of the institutional arrangements within the European Union is a complete separation between the
monetary authorities (that is the ECB), and the fiscal authorities (in the shape of the national government). Article 107
of the amended Treaty of Rome states that "When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any
member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any
government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of
the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision making
bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks". This would appear to preclude the
co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies for it would require the ECB to be influenced by national governments and
others and to pursue objectives other than price stability.
The elevation of monetary policy as the only policy instrument which can be exercised at the European level, combined
with the emphasis of that policy on the control of inflation will tend to generate a deflationary economic environment as
any signs of inflation or "overheating" of some part of the European economy is likely to be met by increase in the
interest rate. This will be exacerbated by the lack of active fiscal policy and the absence of other mechanisms (such as
the promotion of investment) to stimulate aggregate demand. This perspective serves to illustrate that the existing
institutional framework is not adequate. There is no EMU framework to provide for a sufficiently strong fiscal policy at
the European level, and the very limited economic policy co-ordination provided for under Article 103 of the Treaty is
not adequate to afford a EU level fiscal policy.
There are two well-known features of the structure of economic policy making in the European Union which are
particularly relevant for our discussion below. First, monetary policy will be operated by the independent EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) through a system, which involves national central banks in addition to the ECB. The ECB has been
given the objective of securing price stability, without explicit concern over other objectives. The Protocol on the ESCB
(article 105) states that "The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to
the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community" (EU, 1998). The
key decision makers on the ECB will be governors of the national central banks and monetary experts. 
Second, there will not be any fiscal policy operated at the European level. The size of the European budget is relatively
small at less than 1.2 per cent of combined EU members"
GDP in 1997, and is still dominated by the needs of the Common Agricultural Policy (about 50 per cent). Yet, the
MacDougall Report (1997) suggested that monetary union would not be viable without a sufficiently large community
budget for fiscal policy (7.5 per cent of members" GDP). It is also the case that the EU budget must be balanced. The
interaction of those two elements means that there is no scope for active fiscal policy (or indeed for any fiscal policy),
and that the European Union budget is too small to operate as an effective stabiliser or to re-distribute funds from
richer regions to poorer ones in any significant manner. The EU already provides both stabilisation and redistribution
functions in the form of structural and cohesion funds and the common agricultural policy. This redistribution effect in
the EU is estimated at between 0.5 per cent (Sal-I-Martin and Sachs, 1992) and 3 per cent (Bayoumi and Masson, 1995)
of the difference between national GDP per capita and the EU average. 
MECHANICS OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
The main feature of the Stability and Growth Pact is a requirement that the national budget deficit does not exceed 3
per cent of GDP, and failure to meet that requirement could lead to a series of fines depending on the degree to which
the deficit exceeds 3 per cent (as further discussed below). Non Euro members are also required to exercise similar
fiscal control through convergence programmes, though they are not subject to excessive deficit penalties. 
A government which aims to avoid an "excessive" budget deficit of more than 3 per cent of GDP would have to ensure
that the 3 per cent limit is not breached during economic slowdown; and hence that the average deficit during the
course of the business cycle would have to be much lower than 3 per cent. A country"s budgetary data become available
for the Commission to scrutinise on 1 March each year when the stability programmes are submitted. Each programme
will contain information about the paths of the ratios of budget deficit to GDP and national debt to GDP. The Council
(ECOFIN) will examine the stability reports and shall deliver an opinion on a recommendation by the Commission (within
two months of the reports submission). If the stability programme reveals that a country is significantly diverging from
its medium-term budgetary objective, then the council will recommend that the stability programme is strengthened. If
the situation persists then the member state will have been judged to have breached the reference values. The Pact
details "escape" clauses which allows a member state that has an excessive deficit to avoid sanction. If there is an
economic downturn and output has fallen by more than 2 per cent, then the member state will escape sanction
automatically but the deficit should be corrected once the recession has finished. If output falls between 0.75 and 2 per
cent then the Council can use discretion when making a decision on an "excessive" deficit, other factors will be taken
into account such as the abruptness of the downturn, the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends and
whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure.
When the Council has sifted through all relevant information pertaining to the country whose financial position is under
review, it must decide as to whether an excessive deficit exists or not. In making the decision, the Council operates with
a qualified majority, and under the Maastricht Treaty, all EU member states have a vote, including those countries that
are not in the euro area and even the country, which is under consideration. If a country is found to have breached the
reference values, then it has four months to introduce the corrective measures suggested by the Council. If the
country follows the Council"s recommendations, then the "excessive" deficit can continue, but the budget deficit must
be corrected within a year following its identification. A country which chooses not to introduce corrective measures
will be subject to a range of sanctions (Article 104c(11)), at least one or more must be imposed, of which one must be
in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit lodged by the national government. In this instance, it will fall upon EMU
members, exluding the member country under consideration, to reach a decision on sanctions. The non-interest bearing
deposit consists of a fixed component (0.2 per cent of GDP), and a variable component, (one tenth of the difference
between the deficit ratio and the 3 per cent reference value). If the budget deficit is not corrected within two years,
the deposit is forfeited and becomes a fine, whereas if the deficit is corrected within two years the deposit is returned
and the penalty becomes the foregone interest. 
The penalty clause would add to the deficit it is meant to cure, and as such it could generate national opposition. Von
Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) argue that the Stability and Growth Pact tends to
suppress the symptoms without treating the source of the problem. The constraints imposed by the Pact will severely
reduce national fiscal independence and effectively preclude the use of national fiscal policy for demand management
purposes. This is especially the case at present where countries have entered EMU at the upper limit of the Stability
and Growth Pact; OECD (1998) estimates suggest that eight of the eleven countries have budget deficit targets in therange of 1-2 per cent of GDP over the next few years, which is not sufficient to allow automatic stabilisers to work
under the Stability Pact. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) suggest that this restriction on the workings of automatic
stabilisers could lead to weaker fiscal stabilisation and greater output volatility. Further, von Hagen and Eichengreen
(1996) argue that if automatic stabilisers cannot function fully, then pressures will build for fiscal federalism to
provide them. 
This system of financial penalties for breaches of the budget deficit criterion, implies that deflationary fiscal policies
will continue, and indeed intensify as those countries which just met the 3 per cent requirement in conditions of cyclical
upswing will have to tighten the fiscal stance to meet the 3 per cent requirement in times of cyclical downswing
especially. The European Commission has estimated that the sensitivity of the budget balance to output is around 0.5
per cent for the EU, that is a 1 per cent fall in GDP will increase the budget deficit by 0.5 per cent (Buti et al., 1997, p.
7). It was indicated above that a clause was inserted into the Stability Pact, which allows a country to have a larger
deficit in the face of recession. However, even this formal recognition that automatic stabilisers and active fiscal policy
could be hampered may not be sufficient to prevent the Stability and Growth Pact operating to exacerbate recessions. 
Table 1: Retrospective Application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure: Number of cases where the 3 per cent reference







Total number of recessionary episodes 24 9 17
D = 0 per cent
Number of recessionary episodes
exceeding the D =3 per cent
11 1 0
Number of recessionary episodes
exceeding the D =3 per cent in the year
following the recession
5 1 0
D = 2 per cent
Number of recessionary episodes
exceeding the D =3 per cent
18 5 6
Number of recessionary episodes
exceeding the D =3 per cent in the year
following the recession
16 1 5
Source: Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 11, 12 and 13 of Buti et alia (1997)
+ at least 0.75 per cent fall in GDP
++ 0-0.75 per cent fall in GDP
+++ GDP growth positive but at least a 2.5 per cent worsening in the output gap 
D is an arbitrary pre-recession position upon which actual deficit changes are simulated. The balanced budget position
(i.e. D = 0 per cent deficit) was selected because it is consistent with the "close to balance" requirement and the D = 2
per cent position was chosen because it is the likely budgetary position of several member states of the eurozone.
Buti et al. (1997) applied the Stability Pact requirement to previous recession episodes in the EU between 1961-96.
Table 1 summarises some of their findings, column 2 shows that governments which entered a severe recession (a fall
in GDP of greater than 0.75 per cent) with a balanced budget were more likely to avoid breaching the excessive deficit
procedure in the year following the recession than those countries with a pre-recession position deficit of 2 per cent of
GDP. This evidence would suggest that the early stages of EMU are likely to be fraught with difficulty for member
states who have entered Stage Three with deficits ranging from 2-3 per cent of GDP, especially in light of the OECD"s
estimates to which we referred above. Column 4 also offers evidence that countries with a pre-recession position
deficit of 2 per cent will breech the excessive deficit procedure following an economic downturn. Unlike the case of a
severe recession, this situation does not provide exemption from the excessive deficit procedures and sanctions will be
invoked automatically. More worrying is the finding that even countries with low pre-recession budget deficits (or even
surpluses) are at risk of breaching the reference level in the event of a long recession (Buti et al., 1997, p. 29). In
addition, the Pact imposes a heavy burden on those countries with high elasticity of deficit to GDP as the budgetdeficits rise sharply in the face of declining GDP.
AN ALTERNATIVE FULL EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND STABILITY PACT
Background
In this section we propose an alternative pact which we label a full employment, growth and stability pact  to emphasise
the change of policy objectives involved. The development of a full employment, growth and stability pact draws on
three elements : namely a Keynesian analysis of the workings of the economy, the articulation of a specific set of policy
objectives which include full employment and growth, and third a consideration of appropriate institutional
arrangements.
We begin with the recognition that such a pact would be based on an essentially Keynesian analysis of the economy (see
also Arestis and Sawyer, 1998a). This analysis would view fiscal policy as an ingredient in the achievement of high levels
of aggregate demand required to sustain high levels of economic activity. In addition to the broad stance of fiscal
policy, governments can influence the level of aggregate demand through their choice of the composition of taxes and
of public expenditure and through influence over investment expenditure. 
Monetary policy is viewed as operating through interest rates and our analysis points to the extreme difficulties of
controlling monetary aggregates in an endogenous money system. Further, inflation is seen as arising from pressures
on the real side of the economy, whether emanating from conflicts over the distribution of income and/or from a lack
of adequate productive capacity, and where inflation can proceed through the creation of money by the banking system
(see, for example, Arestis, 1997). This brings some important perspectives, namely that creation of adequate
productive capacity through investment, and the building of an equitable income distribution should be seen as
important ingredients of anti-inflationary policy. It is argued here that the use of interest rates to control inflation can
have detrimental effects on the future course of inflation. Unnecessarily tight monetary policy, which may be required
to establish credibility of the ECB in the eyes of the financial markets, will have detrimental effects on future capacity
and thereby on the ability of the economy to reach high levels of employment without inflationary pressures.
Our analysis would suggest that regional and other disparities in economic performance are a general feature of market
economies. These disparities are exacerbated by the forces of cumulative causation with little, if any, tendency for
"market forces" to reduce these disparities (cf. Myrdal, 1957). The euro is certainly launched in the face of substantial
disparities (in terms of unemployment experience and per capita income levels), and the view here is that there will be
little tendency for those initial disparities to decline unless appropriate policy action is taken.
The second element of the development of an alternative pact is the articulation of a set of objectives for economic
policy, the pursuit of which should influence the design of the institutional arrangements and the instruments of
economic policy. These objectives would be quite different from those which lie behind the Stability and Growth Pact.
But they are perhaps largely self-evident, namely those of full employment and sustained economic growth in an
environmentally friendly manner. The achievement of full employment necessarily includes the substantial reduction in
the disparities of unemployment experienced, and the creation of sufficient productive capacity (Sawyer, 1999). In the
development of a different agenda, a symbolic change would be to call the pact between member countries over
economic policy a full employment, growth and stability pact, that is bringing full employment as a key element in the
pact, and placing growth before stability in order of importance.
The third element is the creation and support of appropriate institutional arrangements at the EU and national levels,
and the reformulation of the objectives of economic policy. The only new institution so far created in connection with
the single currency has been, of course, the ECB. We have argued elsewhere that the current ECB arrangements are
problematic and may very well lead to severe economic difficulties within the eurozone. The view expressed here is that
a range of other institutions should be established by the European Union or encouraged by the EU and the member
governments. 
One of the weaknesses of the present institutional arrangements is the separation between monetary policy conducted
by the ECB and the constrained fiscal policy operated by national governments. There is clearly a requirement for the
co-ordination of economic policy across the member countries of the European Union and for the emergence of
appropriate institutional arrangements and policies at the European level. Economic policy at the EU level faces the
additional issue of the disparities of economic performance in terms of employment and unemployment rates and of the
level of GDP per capita across the regions and countries of the EU. It is difficult to think of comparable examples of a
single currency zone in which the disparities of economic performance were on anything like the scale of those within
the EU : for example unemployment in April 1998 varied from 2.1 per cent in the central region of Portugal, 2.6 per
cent in Aaland region of Finland, 27.0 per cent in Calabria, Italy and 29.9 per cent in Andalucia in Southern Spain. 
There are major differences of banking systems and financial institutional arrangements within the eurozone. Thisreinforces the difficulties of the one instrument approach to economic policy, which is embodied in the use of interest
rates for macroeconomic management. The differences in the financial arrangements will mean that the impact of an
interest rate change will vary considerably from country to country. There are many other differences over, for
example, wage bargaining and price determination such that national economies behave in different ways, leading to
different policies being appropriate (for a comprehensive analysis of these, and other relevant issues, see Arestis and
Sawyer, 1999). 
Inflation
Much of the Stability and Growth Pact focuses on the achievement of low inflation through the use of monetary policy,
and interest rate in particular. There are a range of views as to how monetary policy, change in interest rates more
specifically, influences the pace of inflation, and it is worthwhile to distinguish two particular views. The first, which is
essentially a monetarist view, is that there is a causal mechanism running from changes in the stock of money to the
rate of inflation. This view rests on either the stock of money being exogeneous for the private sector but subject to
change by the authorities or the supply of money being manipulated by interest rates. In the latter case there is the
question of how to manipulate interest rates to affect the money supply since the liquidity preference of banks may
lead to a different stock of money than what is intended. For example, it may very well be that the authorities raise
interest rates to try to achieve a lower (than otherwise) stock of money, but commercial banks increase the supply of
credit and thus the stock of money since it is now more profitable to do so. It is also the case that money has to enter
the system in some way, and the most obvious route is that it is created by the banking system in response to a
demand for loans (credit) by the private sector. However, the view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and that
expansion of the money supply can be used as a control mechanism over the rate of inflation appears to lie behind the
operations of the ECB. 
The second, which runs along the lines suggested by the Bank of England (1999) in their discussion of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, focuses on the impact which interest rates have on aggregate demand, and then the
impact which demand has on the pace of inflation. The Bank of England (1999) view the official interest rate as
influencing market interest rates, asset prices, expectations and confidence, and the exchange rate. These factors
then influence domestic and net external demand, which in turn influence domestic inflationary pressures, and import
prices. The growth of the stock of money adjusts to the pace of inflation as the stock of money is willingly held by the
public, and the demand for money depends on the level of nominal income. 
The first view suggests that inflation can be controlled by monetary policy without any harm to the real side of the
economy. The second view would suggest that the stock of money adjusts to inflation, generated on the real side of the
economy, and that monetary policy in the form of interest rates can have effects on the real side of the economy.
Further, it should also be recognised that monetary policy through the manipulation of interest rates may not  an
effective way of guiding the economy, and the effects of interest rate changes on economic performance are highly
indirect and uncertain, and as such difficult to predict. We, thus, cast some doubt on the effectiveness of interest rate
policy in the relatively closed EU economy, specifically in terms of the inflation objective. In so far as interest rate
policy can influence the pace of inflation, it does so through suppressing aggregate demand, which in turn may well have
detrimental effects on investment and the creation of productive capacity and have hysteresis effects on labour force
participation. 
The perspective on inflation underlying our proposals is rather different. Inflation is generated by factors on the real
side of the economy, and then in effect validated by a growth of the stock of money. The achievement of high levels of
economic activity without inflationary pressures then requires two elements. First, institutional arrangements for
collective wage determination and price setting which are conducive to low inflation. Wage determination within the EU is
currently undertaken on a decentralised and fragmented basis, even where it is (or has been) centralised within a
particular national economy. The institutional arrangements for collective wage determination at the EU level do not
currently exist, and this effectively rules out any possibilities for the operation of incomes policy or similar for the next
few years. There are a number of examples in Europe (within and without the EU) of centralised institutional
arrangements, which have been conducive to relatively low inflation : for example Austria, Germany and perhaps the
most successful Norway. 
Second, in addition to the construction of relevant institutional arrangements, it is necessary to construct a well
functioning real economy which is also conducive to combining low inflation with high levels of economic activity. We take
the view that a major element of that would be the construction of a level and location of productive capacity which is
capable of providing work to all that seek paid employment. This would require that not only is the general level of
productive capacity is raised but also that much of that increase is directed towards the less prosperous regions of the
EU. This would require the enhancement of the functions of the EIB (or a similar institution) to ensure high rates of
capital formation, appropriately located across the European Union : and we return to discuss an investment bank
below. Inflation has generally recently reached low levels, not just in European economies but almost world-wide. The present
danger is more one of deflation, both in terms of low levels of demand and of falling prices, rather than of inflation. The
construction of European wide institutional arrangements would be a long-term project, and is not something, which the
European Union or its member countries can readily bring into being. It may though be able to act as a facilitator
through appropriate legislation on the role of trade unions and employers" organisation, and the encouragement of the
operation and growth of such organisations at the European level.
Fiscal Policy
Two specific considerations inform our approach to fiscal policy. The first is the idea that there is no strong reason to
believe that the private sector will generate sufficient demand to underpin full employment, and consequently full
employment may well require a budget deficit which in effect mops up excess private savings. This is not to say that
budget deficits are inevitable or in some way desirable in themselves, but rather may be a necessary element in the
achievement of full employment. The second is the potency or otherwise of fiscal policy in stimulating aggregate
demand. Here it is argued that within the European Union, fiscal policy would be expected to be a more, rather than a
less, effective policy as compared with fiscal policy at the national level. The European Union will constitute a relatively
closed economy, and as such there would only be small leakages of any demand stimulus. It is ironic to note that fiscal
policy is being downgraded at time when it may become more potent. In our discussion of fiscal policy, it should be
clearly understood that we are not advocating any form of "fine tuning" involving frequent (more than annual) changes
in tax and expenditure policies. Instead we would be advocating "coarse tuning" under which budget deficits are used to
support aggregate demand as necessary, given the levels of private demand. 
At both national and European Union level, the use of fiscal policy is heavily constrained by the Stability and Growth
Pact. It has been indicated above that the limit in the Stability and Growth Pact on budget deficits of no more the 3 per
cent of GDP translates into a requirement for a budget, which is in surplus or very small deficit averaged over the
business cycle. A balanced budget implies (as a matter of an accounting identity) that the net sum of private savings
minus investment plus trade deficit (borrowing overseas) is zero. There is little evidence that high levels of employment
would necessarily generate an equality between savings and investment, and specifically it is expected that there would
be an excess of savings over investment which needs to be mopped up by foreign lending or budget deficit. The limits on
budget deficits would prevent this occurring, and hence full employment would require a balance of trade surplus and
the consequent foreign lending. At present, the European Union runs a significant trade surplus with the rest of the
world, but the counterpart is, of course, that other countries run a trade deficit and are borrowing from the European
Union. It is doubtful whether such a pattern of surpluses and deficits is sustainable in the long term with the
consequent build up of interest flows to service the borrowing. 
It is generally recognised that the 3 per cent of GDP limit on budget deficits in the Stability and Growth Pact is
arbitrary, and that this figure appears to have been plucked out of the air (some suggest a combination of the average
German experience and a figure which corresponded to capital expenditure by many governments). In view of this
argument and also of the ability to absorb shocks as well as to underpin high levels of aggregate demand, would suggest
that the figure of 3 per cent is highly inappropriate. In the absence of an EU level fiscal policy, national governments
should be allowed to pursue budget deficits as they think appropriate. Ideally, this should be seen as a temporary
arrangement during a period in which a proper EU fiscal policy is generated. In the interim, national governments may
well be constrained by the financial markets on how far they can borrow, and different governments may face different
credit ratings in the financial markets (as different States within the United States of America do at present). There
are no doubt "externalities" of one country's fiscal policy on another in the context of the European Union, which can
operate through the spill-over effects of demand from fiscal policy and perhaps through the effects on interest rates.
There is a paradox here in that interest rate is used as an instrument of monetary policy with the "repo" rate set by
the ECB, and concern over the size of budget deficits through their impact on interest rates. There is then much to be
said for co-ordinated fiscal policies, but in the context where that co-ordination is over the stances of active fiscal
policies and where the policies themselves are aimed towards the achievement of high levels of economic activity. In
view of the arguments of the European Commission (1977, what is known as McDougall Report (1997) , such
co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies become paramount. The euro will be greatly enabled to work under such
circumstances. 
Rules which specify a fixed limit on government borrowing fail to recognise that it serves as a mechanism for
distributing over time the cost of adjustment to shocks and for smoothing the tax burden associated with public
investment. We would argue that constraints on government borrowing reduce the flexibility of national governments"
fiscal policy and make fiscal co-ordination extremely difficult. Moreover, we would suggest that the motivation behind
the adoption of fiscal constraints by the Maastricht Treaty and their strengthening through the Stability and Growth
Pact are questionable. Borrowing restrictions are not present in existing monetary unions (Eichengreen, 1997). In fact,
it could be reasoned that borrowing constraints would be justified only if the sub-central government had little or no tax
raising powers and was dependent on central government for most of its income because this increases the risk of a
bailout. In instances where a significant proportion of sub-central government expenditure was generated from its owntax base, then the central government could force the sub-central government to take remedial action by either a
decrease in expenditure or an increase in taxation, or indeed both, and government borrowing restraints should not be
employed. The latter case applies to European monetary union, national governments still retain tax powers with a large
tax base and as such it can use this as a means to finance borrowing. 
The separation of the monetary authorities from the fiscal authorities and the decentralisation of the fiscal authorities
will inevitably make any co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policy difficult. Since the ECB is instructed to focus on
inflation while the fiscal authorities will have a broader range of concerns, there will be considerable grounds for
conflict. This suggests a need for the evolution of a body, which is charged with the co-ordination of these monetary
and fiscal policies. In the absence of such a body, tensions will emerge in the real sector when monetary policy and fiscal
policy pull in different directions (Begg and Green, 1998, p. 131). The Stability and Growth Pact in effect resolves these
issues by establishing the dominance of the monetary authorities (ECB) over the fiscal authorities (national
governments). From this discussion, our proposals concerning fiscal policy would include three elements. First, the
present constraints on national budget positions should be removed, and national governments should be allowed to set
fiscal policy as they deem appropriate in the light of economic circumstances, and their perceptions of the costs and
benefits involved. Second, institutional arrangements for the coordination of national fiscal policies be strengthened.
Third, European Union institutional arrangements are required for the operation of an EU fiscal and to ensure that
monetary authorities do not dominant economic policy making.
Monetary Policy and the ECB
Monetary policy typically operates through the setting of a key interest rate (such as the "repo" rate), rather than
through controls over the stock of money. This means that there is a single instrument which is taken to influence the
future rate of inflation. But the rate of interest (or more accurately the spectrum of interest rates which rests upon
this key rate) has a wide range of influences, and of particular importance is that over the exchange rate and possibly
the rate of investment. A recent review of the properties of the major macroeconometric models of the UK indicates
that "the chief mechanism by which the models achieve change in the inflation rate is through the exchange rate"
(Church et alia , 1997, p. 92). The effects of an exchange rate change will be much smaller on the European Union
economy which trades relatively little with non-European Union economies than on say the Dutch economy where imports
and exports amount to over 50 per cent of its GDP. The relatively closed nature of the European Union in terms of
international trade (with imports and exports amounting to less than 10 per cent of GDP) means that variations in the
exchange rate of the euro will have much less impact on prices than in more open economies.
It should be noted that monetary policy through the use of interest rates becomes more problematic at the European
level as compared with the national level for four rather different reasons. First, the differences in financial
structures, and in particular differences in the extent of variable rate and fixed rate borrowing and in the effect of
interest rate changes on economic activity, mean that the effects of interest rate changes will be far from uniform
across the EMU member countries. An interest rate rise may succeed in slowing down economic activity in some
countries but not in others. As noted by Begg (1997), there is a large divergence in the nature and use of financial
products across countries. For example, the use of longer-term financial contracts that insulate the borrower from the
fluctuations in the short-term interest rates is more common in some countries in comparison with others, and this will
retard the impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand.
Second, monetary policy has differential effects on different regions and countries. As the Bank of England (1999)
recognises, monetary policy "sets one interest rate for the economy as a whole, and can only take account of the
impact of official rate changes on the aggregate of individuals in the economy" (p. 7). Monetary policy is
undifferentiated in that a single official rate will apply (though it may lead to a range of interest rates depending on the
mark-ups applied by individual banks). The rules governing the allocation of credit may differ according to the decisions
of the national central banks (though, of course, there are constraints on the variation of the rules in a single market),
but the variation of rules is not undertaken centrally in pursuit of regional development.
Third, the emergence of the euro will lead to a rather novel situation in which there are two or three dominant
currencies at the global level: the dollar, the euro (especially if UK joins the EMU) and possibly the yen (depending on
resolution of the present difficulties in the Japanese economy). Each of these major currencies will have a basket of
currencies whose value is virtually fixed relative to it. The setting of the euro interest rate will be heavily conditioned by
the dollar and the yen interest rates and, in particular; there is the threat of instability as one set of interest rates
responds to the setting of the others. For example, the pursuit of inconsistent exchange rate targets through interest
rates would lead to a form of interest rate war. 
Fourth, under present arrangements the European Union cannot run a budget deficit and national governments cannot
monetise their deficits. A growing economy requires a gradual increase in the stock of money as well as a banking
system, which can provide loans to finance investment, in the course of which money is created. The first statement
implies that there is no direct mechanism by which the monetary base can expand as the EU and national governmentsare not allowed to "print money". The second statement implies that broad money (say M2 or M3) has to expand in line
with national income (though not necessarily at the same rate), and hence that the ratio of M2 or M3 to M0 grows over
time. There would seem to be three possibilities. The first is that in effect the ECB does monetise national government
debt through open market operations, even though that would run counter to the general ideas on the non-monetisation
of government deficits. The second is that as the ratio grows, the banking system becomes less liquid and more prone
to instability. The third is that the ECB imposes a reserve ratio requirement that prevents the ratio from rising, but
equally prevents the necessary monetary expansion to underpin economic growth.
Central banks usually have a range of roles linked with regulation and stability of the financial system, but these appear
to be lacking in the case of the ECB. In particular, there is no specific requirement for the ECB to act as lender of last
resort, though the ECB can decide to do so (see, for example, Articles 17 and 18 of the Stature of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank ). Under a single currency there is no proper framework for
crisis management. The traditional role of a central bank has been completely decoupled, with the ECB assuming
monetary control and the national central banks retaining the supervisory role. It is argued that in the event of a
banking crisis these two roles over-lap, the national bank, acting as lender of last resort, would wish to inject liquidity
into the financial system; however, it would be constrained given that money supply control falls under the remit of the
ECB (Financial Times , 23rd September, 1998). This argument should be qualified in an important way. The ECB"s main
objective is the pursuit of price stability, but it is also responsible, along with national central banks, for banking
surveillance (Hahn, 1991; Article 105(5) of the Stature of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank ), though in this respect it can only offer a non-binding opinion. Yet in this area, the ECB"s potential role
could be enhanced considerably, there remains scope for an expansion of its current supervisory role subject to ECOFIN
approval (Article 105(6), op.cit). Furthermore, prevention can play an important role in limiting the possibility of
financial crisis: higher capital and liquidity reserve requirements than those currently in operation can in principle
reduce the severity of crises and strengthen banking supervision which would lessen the risk of bank bankruptcies.
The ECB at present stands as the only body which can implement economic policy at a European Union level. The ways in
which the ECB operates is crucial for the economic health of the European Union, although we argue below that economic
policy making at the EU level should be also substantially extended. The ECB suffers from two major shortcomings,
namely its undemocratic and unrepresentative nature, and the objective which it has been set. Hence, we argue that the
ECB should be changed in two significant ways : the membership of the board of directors should be broadened and the
directors made directly answerable to the European Parliament, and the objectives set for it reformulated. A further
change would be an increase in the transparency of the operations of the ECB.
The setting of interest rates seems to be regarded by some as a technical matter : indeed part of the rationale for an
independent central bank is that decisions on interest rates are depoliticised by being taken out of the hands of
politicians. When, in contrast, interest rates have distributional consequences and have differential impacts on regions
and industries (whether directly or indirectly through, for example, the exchange rate), then the setting of interest
rates should be influenced by those possible consequences. The board of directors of the ECB should be broadened
through the explicit representation of different industrial sectors and of workers and consumers. An alternative would
be for the board of directors to be appointed by the European Parliament in a way which, at least informally, leads to a
wide representation of interests.
An alternative full employment, growth and stability pact would, thus, involve major changes to the operations of the
ECB. We have argued for a change in the objectives set for the ECB, and a recognition of the channels of monetary
influence with due regard being paid to the distributional effects of interest rate changes. Further, there is a need for
the reformulation of the regulatory role of the ECB. In this respect, the ECB"s most important function is that of
ensuring orderly conditions prevail in the money market. In order to achieve this, the reformulated ECB should be
required to act as lender of last resort and not merely possess the potential to act as such. Moreover, the ECB should
adopt a more pro-active stance regarding bank surveillance and supervision. The proposal for the reformulation of
objectives readily follows from what has been previously said: that is the ECB should be charged with setting interest
rates in a manner, which encourages growth and full employment, rather than merely inflation. 
Adjustment Mechanisms
The adoption of a single currency by eurozone countries clearly removes the possibility of variation in the value of their
domestic currency. Changes in the exchange rate can allow a country to offset differential shocks and differences in
economic performance. It may be questioned how far a country can determine its own exchange rate in the globalised
financial markets, though since an exchange rate is the relative value of one currency in terms of another it is rarely
the case that one country can completely determine the value of its own currency. It is also the case that exchange
rates have been highly volatile since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and that exchange rates have
diverged significantly from purchasing power parity (see, for example, Krugman, 1989, and Rogoff , 1996).
Nevertheless, variation in the exchange rate (whether in the context of a fixed or a flexible exchange rate system) does
provide a safety valve to adjustment to differential shocks and economic performance, even though the safety valvemay not always work quickly (in the case of fixed exchange rates) or may often be faulty (in the case of flexible
exchange rates). 
It is clear that there are few, if any, mechanisms with the Stability and Growth Pact and the single currency for a
country or region to adjust to differential shocks and economic performance. There is a notable absence of automatic
stabilisers at the level with the requirement of a balanced EU budget and the small scale of that budget. The ability of
national governments to stabilise their own economies becomes more circumscribed through the requirements of the
Stability and Growth Pact and the limits on the size of budget deficits. It is often pointed out that most single currency
zones involve a central or federal government tax and public expenditure programme, which is substantial relative to
national GDP and a government budget, which can run significant deficits. The tax and public expenditure programme
generally involves redistribution from richer regions to poorer ones, whether as an automatic consequence of a
progressive tax and social security system or as specific acts of policy. The redistribution acts a stabiliser with
negative shocks leading to lower taxation and higher social security payments in the region which is adversely affected.
With the removal of exchange rate variations as an adjustment mechanism, it could be expected that economies would
adjust to differential shocks and economic performance through a variety of other routes. These would include (in
response to a negative shock) declines in economic activity, reductions in living standards and outward migration. There
is then a requirement for the development of a larger EU tax base within a progressive tax system and the use of the
tax revenue in a redistributive manner. 
The problem of unemployment will be particularly serious in those cases where governments have chosen the wrong
exchange rate at entry. An overvalued entry exchange rate will mean an extended period of recession to accommodate
its effects, which emanate from the absence of the adjustable exchange rate safety valve. This is accentuated by the
virtual absence of fiscal transfers, whether automatic or discretionary, from the relatively rich regions to the
relatively poor ones. There is clearly not a tax and social security system operating at the European Union level which
would make transfers between rich and poor in an automatic manner, and to provide an element of fiscal stabilisation.
The expenditures on regional aid (structural and cohesion funds) and to a lesser degree agricultural policies do make
some transfers from rich to poor, but on a very limited scale. In short, the European budget is neither on a sufficient
scale nor of the right design to provide significant interregional insurance in the EMU (Fatas, 1998).
Investment Bank
The present disparities in regional unemployment levels (and also in labour market participation rates) within the EU
would suggest that even if full employment were achieved in some regions, there would still be very substantial levels of
unemployment in many others. In the presence of such disparities in unemployment, the achievement of a low level of
unemployment overall (not to mention full employment) would be well neigh impossible. Inflationary pressures would build
up in the fully employed regions even when the less prosperous regions were still suffering from significant levels of
unemployment. Interest rates would then rise to dampen down the inflationary pressures in the prosperous regions
without consideration for the continuing unemployment in other regions.
Eichengreen (1997) offered the suggestion that the European Investment Bank (EIB) can borrow off-budget to perform
tax-smoothing functions, however, this would exceed the EIB"s present remit. Article 198e of the Maastricht Treaty
states that "the task of the EIB shall be to contribute, by having recourse to the capital market and utilising its own
resources, to the balanced and steady development of the common market in the interest of the community". Whether
the functions of the EIB can be enlarged to include stabilisation policy (distribution over time) is extremely questionable,
however, it can entail redistribution across countries, and it is specifically this function which should be expanded and
strengthened from its present form where assistance is only in the form of loans and guarantees.
Therefore, a further recommendation would be to have a revamped EIB to supplement the activities of the ECB, with the
specific objective of enhancing investment activity in those regions where unemployment is acute. Enhanced investment
activity will, thus, aim to reduce the dispersion of unemployment within the framework of reducing unemployment in
general. This could be achieved through encouraging long-term investment whenever this is necessary by providing
appropriate finance for it.
We suggest an overhaul of the EIB"s remit because of the changing environment in which it operates. As highlighted by
Honohan (1995), the EIB was established at a time when national capital markets were less developed than at present.
Now, however, many lenders of loanable funds compete with the EIB and in this respect its public policy role is shrinking.
Despite this trend, there still remains scope to extend the EIB"s public policy role. In particular one area for possible
intervention has been identified. The case for a revamped and extended EIB is based on three considerations. First,
there is a need for differentiated policies, which will enable the less prosperous regions to catch up with the more
prosperous ones, which will enable higher average levels of employment and economic activity. Second, the forces of
cumulative causation in the context of a single currency and market will tend to stimulate investment in the more
prosperous regions rather than in the less prosperous ones. Third, the high set-up costs of venture capital projects and
the disproportionate number of small firms in the EU peripheral areas (which generally experience higher levels ofunemployment) provides scope for the provision of subsidies for venture capital activities because costs are mainly
independent of the scale of borrowing (Honohan, 1995).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The current proposals for the EMU are based on the classical dichotomy with a separation between the real and the
monetary sides of the economy with the (equilibrium) level of unemployment (effectively the NAIRU) and output
determined on the supply-side of the economy and the level of prices (and hence the rate of inflation) set by the rate of
expansion of the money supply. These arrangements along with the so-called Stability and Growth Pact we view as highly
undesirable in view of the problems that we have identified above. It is for this very reason that we have suggested a
new pact, a full employment, growth and stability pact , a very different pact from the one currently proposed for the
EMU.
This is even more urgent and pertinent now, in view of the recent pronouncements by ECB officials. Its president stated
recently at a press conference (13 October, 1998) that "the structural budgetary positions in several Member States
are still far from being close to balance or in surplus as required by the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore, these
Member States are not yet sufficiently prepared to enable automatic stabilisers to function in the event of a slowdown
in real GDP growth, while still respecting the 3 per cent reference level set out in the Treaty and ensuring a decline of
debt ratios at an appropriate pace. Moreover, in a number of Member States against the background of a still
favourable and partly better than expected growth performance, short-term budgetary targets appear not to
represent structural improvements". Surely, a healthy future for the EU cannot be in prospect when economic policies
are based on these pronouncements.
The full employment, growth and stability pact , which we propose in this paper, would have four major elements. First,
a reform of the ECB to make it more accountable and to pursue a broader range of objectives. It should be clear that
the ECB must act as lender of last resort, and to participate in the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies.
Second, to extend the EU level budget to become more redistributive (across countries and time) and to provide much
more discretion for national governments to pursue expansionary fiscal policy. Third, the expanded role of an
investment bank to ensure that the less prosperous regions share in economic growth. Fourth, the encouragement of
institutional arrangements which are conducive to low inflation.
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